CFMEU inquiry news updates: Spotlight turns to Cross River Rail, with bosses on stand

Particular proponents bidding for the work were then mentioned by unions in the meeting, at which point the authority’s probity advisors who were also present stepped in. The union group then turned to pushing the authority on why it had not helped set up talks with bidders.

The broad position of the group, as described in Newton’s statement, was that such an agreement would cover all unions, trades and contractors, and unions would “sort out coverage between themselves”.

At this stage, these were publicly known and the AWU – which was pushing for a standalone tunnel agreement for itself, and one of two other separate agreements for other relevant unions – had begun early talks.

Newton says Trad pushed back in the meeting, likely due to the authority having briefed her about the legal concerns with the issue, and gave an undertaking to write to the authority to outline her expectation around compliance with the state’s best practice principles.

“We were well aware that we were digging a tunnel, and the people who had the coverage weren’t in the room,” Newton says. “And so by proposing a single framework agreement over the full project, then the coverage would be cut across.”

Trad wrote to the authority in February 2019, suggesting that it should consider a “project specific” enterprise agreement, and made repeated mention to Queen’s Wharf as an example of best practice conditions.

Asked by Gisonda if he viewed this as a way to “placate the unions or give them something they were looking for”, Newton says he does.

The inquiry, and Newton’s evidence, will resume at 10am tomorrow.

During the meeting, the CFMEU figures indicated they wanted a single “project agreement” for the entire suite of Cross River Rail works and would be able to advise on which contractors would be most suitable.

“This meeting was purely to advise the application of best practice principles,” Newton says.

“We really weren’t going to be talking about the tender process, they brought that up, and as soon as that started to happen, I felt very uncomfortable and from my vantage point thought that it was something that we should shut down in the conversation very quickly.”

Gisonda says there will be further evidence given this week that such a split is “orthodoxy in this country”.

There’s now a bit of discussion about the reason for the establishment of the statutory Cross River Rail Delivery Authority to manage the project for the state government in late 2016.

“It will operate outside of the political framework with an independent boardroom, while still being subject to the oversight of Queensland government,” explanatory notes read to the inquiry state.

Now, we get to the “big decision” from the Palaszczuk government in its 2017 budget to fully fund the $5.4 billion project with only $10 million to-date in federal support.

This was despite earlier recognition “this was going to be a very difficult project to fund without federal funds,” Gisonda says.

And that takes us to the morning tea break.

In 2010, the cabinet released the first reference design of the project for consultation.

“What you see here, commissioner, is just the orthodox preliminary steps that a government takes in order to progress a major infrastructure project,” Gisonda says.

Within months, the government’s submission under then-premier Anna Bligh to Infrastructure Australia placed the project at the top of its funding submission.

In 2011, a Deloitte economic evaluation report for the Department of Transport and Main Roads put a $5.2 billion figure on the total infrastructure cost for the project, on assumption of construction between 2014-2019.

That report estimates a 22.6 per cent increase in rail patronage with the project, and 15 per cent reduction in average rail trip time.