Let’s stop pretending AUKUS makes us safer

A couple of weeks ago, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney highlighted the need for “naming reality”. Accordingly, we have to “name” the wishful thinking that is AUKUS. While it is clear Australia needs a credible submarine capability, the AUKUS plan is neither credible nor capable of meeting Australia’s defence needs. The Australian Defence Force has correctly described this as a high-risk project – with no Plan B.

It is highly questionable whether a few nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) will be effective in defending Australia: too big for our northern waters, too few, difficult to man, unreliable and potentially obsolete by 2050, if not before. But not to worry – they will probably never come.

It is very unlikely, under the AUKUS Pillar I agreement, that the US will sell us three to five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines, given US legislation, ongoing US shipyard sustainment difficulties and major build delays.

The US legislation is very clear. The AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act, Code 10431, says that the transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia “will not degrade the United States undersea capabilities”.

To meet its own needs, the US must build two Virginia-class SSNs per year. To supply Australia, it must build at a rate of 2.33 annually; the current rate is 1.13 and has proved very resistant to increasing, despite major increases in funding (by $US9 billion since 2018). Australia’s $US3.3 billion contribution is not enough. In addition, the US is now prioritising construction of the much larger Columbia submarines, making increased production rates of Virginia-class submarines even less likely.

Operational availability is also a problem, though seldom mentioned. Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker, the program executive officer for Attack submarines, noted that with the “Virginia-class of Attack submarines suffering from maintenance woes and low operational availability, the US Navy is working to ensure its next Attack submarine is easier to sustain”. This makes it even less likely the US can spare submarines. Even if they do – how available will they be? Indeed, during a conflict, would we even get spare parts if US subs needed them too?

How many times does Australia need to be told this a very long shot? Last year, the US Navy’s Chief of Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle testified that there are “no magic beans” to boosting the US’ shipbuilding capacity. UK submarine building is even more behind, but that is another story.

Elbridge Colby, the US under-secretary of defence for policy, said in 2024 that “it would be crazy for the United States to give away its single most important asset for a conflict with China over Taiwan when it doesn’t have enough already … money is not the only issue – it’s also time, limits on our workforce, so both sides of this vitally important alliance need to look reality in the face.”

Late last year, his Pentagon review of AUKUS was reportedly significantly modified by the president’s office before Trump declared AUKUS was “full steam ahead”.

The US Congressional Research Service in October 2024 proposed that Australia did not receive any US SSNs but focused on other defence capabilities. It noted that “there is little indication that, prior to announcing the AUKUS Pillar I project … an analysis of alternatives or equivalent rigorous comparative analysis was conducted to examine whether Pillar I would be a more cost-effective way to spend defence resources”.

So why is the US keen to go ahead with this? The benefits for it are obvious. Much more important than the (non-refundable) billions of dollars is having a new base at Garden Island and a new maintenance shipyard at Henderson in WA. Even better, the AUKUS agreement locks us into US war-fighting plans for the next 40 years. Decisions when Australia goes to war will be made in DC, not in Canberra.

Current US missile and warhead developments mean Virginia-class subs (in reality US-operated subs) will probably carry nuclear missiles by the early 2030s. The initial assurance that they would not be nuclear-armed has vanished, just as the initial assurance we would not end up with the weapons-grade nuclear waste has vanished.

Fuel for these subs requires serious enrichment technology, significantly weakening nuclear non-proliferation norms. Japan, South Korea, Iran and Turkey are now interested in this technology. Also, which lucky community will host the high-level nuclear waste?

By hosting these submarines (and nuclear-capable B-52 bombers in the Northern Territory), we not only lose sovereignty but also become a target ourselves. These submarines are too big to defend Australia’s northern waters, and there will be too few of them – if any – to provide meaningful defence. Advances in underwater detection technology will probably render them obsolete by 2050, if not before.

Finally, the massive cost of these submarines will cannibalise spending on other more effective defence weaponry. It will also limit funds available for health, education and other critical social needs. Austerity in the UK has severely damaged the NHS, once a source of national pride. Don’t think it can’t happen here.

AUKUS Pillar II and the UK submarines are also extremely problematic, but that needs another article.

We must have a public independent review of AUKUS. We need to consider alternatives that are more cost-effective and in our national interest. Sovereignty matters.

Defence secrecy is no excuse, and wishful thinking is very poor strategy. It is time to stop gaslighting the public.

Dr Margaret Beavis is the vice president of the Medical Association for Prevention of War.

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